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Pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Amici 
Intellectual Property Law Professors request leave to file the accompanying amicus 
curiae brief in support of Appellee Novella. Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 29, 
Amici attempted to obtain the consent of all parties before moving for permission 
to file the proposed brief. Appellees have consented to the filing of this brief, but 
Appellants have refused consent. 
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 Amici are intellectual property law professors who teach and have written 
extensively about the Lanham Act and related intellectual property subjects. Our 
sole interest is in the orderly development of Lanham Act law and First 
Amendment law in a way that serves the public interest. 
THE AMICUS’S BRIEF WILL ASSIST THE COURT AND IS RELEVANT 
TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
Amici Intellectual Property Law Professors offer this brief to explain how 
this Court can avoid an inappropriate application of the Lanham Act to 
noncommercial speech, while also reserving an appropriate scope for the false 
advertising provisions of the Lanham Act in true commercial speech cases.  Amici 
are concerned both about overextension of the Lanham Act to interfere with any 




constraints that the First Amendment should put on ordinary Lanham Act false 
advertising cases.  
Given the recurring question of the intersection of the Lanham Act and the 
First Amendment, resolution of this case is likely to have significant legal impact, 
and Amici hope to provide useful background for the Court as it considers the case.   
 CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Amici request that this Court accept the 
attached brief as filed.  
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
 
 Amici are law professors who teach and have written extensively about 
advertising law and related subjects. Our sole interest in this case is in the orderly 
development of advertising law in a way that serves the public interest.  Amici take 
no position on the merits of the factual claims, or on the legal issues except insofar 
as they relate to the Lanham Act false advertising claims.*  
 
Joined: Stacey Dogan, Boston University School of Law 
Eric Goldman, Santa Clara Law 
Michael Grynberg, DePaul University College of Law 
Mark Lemley, Stanford Law School 
Yvette Joy Liebesman, Saint Louis University School of Law 
Mark McKenna, Notre Dame Law School 
Jessica Silbey, Northeastern University School of Law 





* All signatories speak only on behalf of themselves. Institutional affiliations are 




CONSENT OF THE PARTIES 
 
 Counsel for Appellees consented to the filing of this brief. Counsel for 
Appellants declined to consent. Amici’s motion for leave to file this Amicus Brief 





I. Summary of Argument 
	
   The District Court correctly determined that the challenged speech of  Dr. 
Steven Novella was not commercial speech for purposes of applying the Lanham 




    There are difficult cases about the boundary between commercial and 
noncommercial speech.  This is not one of them.  Commercial speech, at its core, 
“does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).  Here, “the 
‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction ... 
and other varieties of speech,” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-
456 (1978), on which the Supreme Court’s doctrine “heavily” rests, Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 
(1985), is enough to decide this case.   
   Appellant seeks to have Appellees’ speech characterized as commercial 
because Appellees stood to benefit from membership fees by people who agreed 
with Appellees’ outlook on scientific issues and/or wanted to support similar 




designed to support the sale of something other than speech itself.  Appellant 
makes a category error, conflating for-profit informative speech with commercial 
speech, a far more limited subset thereof.  See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at iv, vii, 50-
51.   
   The fact that a diagram is needed to track the alleged connection between 
Appellees’ speech and profit suggests the problem with Appellant’s theory.  See, 
e.g., Appellant’s Br. at v.  Such an attenuated connection between the content of 
the speech and the ultimate financial benefit to the speaker is a hallmark of 
noncommercial speech, not commercial speech.  Cf. Gordon & Breach Science 
Publishers, S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1541 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that the separate interests of an officer of a nonprofit 
association didn’t have a sufficient connection to the nonprofit’s publications to 
“convert [the nonprofit’s] fully protected commentary into less-protected 
commercial speech”).   
   The New York Times seeks a return on its capital, and may even hope to 
lure advertisers targeting particular demographics, for example by running a 
section on wealthy New Yorkers, but neither of those facts makes its speech 
“commercial” speech, a specific category of content under the First Amendment.  
Appellant’s argument can’t distinguish Appellees’ activities from those of 




ProPublica.1   See Appellant’s Br. at 5 (arguing that Appellees’ speech was 
commercial because website ran ads for third parties); id. at 46-47 (arguing that 
soliciting donations to support investigations was commercial speech).   
   The district court found the dispositive facts: The articles here proposed no 
commercial transaction, and weren’t related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience. They clearly intended to raise public awareness about 
issues pertaining to Appellant’s treatments.  The only products or services the 
articles referenced were Appellant’s treatments.  To the extent the second article 
referred to Appellee Novella’s practice, “it is in direct response to the instant 
litigation as opposed to an independent plug for that practice.”  Tobinick v. 
Novella, --- F. Supp. 3d ---- , 2015 WL 6777458, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2015). 
   Matters might well be different if, in the course of soliciting patients for 
his own practice, Appellee Novella had made factual statements about Appellant’s 
treatments.  It is notable, however, that Appellant carefully avoided any such 
allegation.  See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at vii (failing to specify what, exactly, 
Appellee did to further his “goals of making money and self-promotion”).  
Appellant argues only that the challenged speech served to draw dollars to 
																																																								
1 Award-winning journalism organization ProPublica investigates specific entities 
and industries.  ProPublica may inflict economic harm when its reporting reveals 
disturbing facts.  Furthermore, ProPublica actively solicits donations to continue 
this work.  See https://www.propublica.org/investigations/.  Appellant accuses 




Appellee SGU, not to medical services provided by Appellee Novella.  Appellant’s 
Br. at 2-5.   This concession simplifies matters considerably. According to the facts 
as produced to the district court on summary judgment, the only path to profit for 
Appellees from the challenged articles lay in convincing audiences that their 
speech was worth supporting—not that Appellee Novella’s medical practice was.  
That profit mechanism is insufficient to trigger the Lanham Act.  Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (rejecting the argument that “motion 
pictures” fall outside “the First Amendment’s aegis because their production, 
distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit”); 
Dryer v. National Football League, 814 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding 
that “the NFL’s economic motivations alone cannot convert these productions into 
commercial speech” despite the fact that films enhanced the NFL’s brand and 
increased the appeal of NFL Football generally). 
   The district court’s holding that Novella could be a noncommercial speaker 
in some contexts, while also being a practicing doctor, made sense of the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction.  When Dr. Oz counsels an individual 
patient, his speech is professional speech, and it may result in malpractice liability 
if it falls below the standard of care without implicating the First Amendment.  
See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis 




remedies that he offers to sell, his speech about those remedies is commercial 
speech. When Dr. Oz sells books touting amazing cures, he is not ordinarily 
engaging in commercial speech.2   
   Appellant’s attempt to muddy the distinction between constitutionally 
noncommercial, for-profit speech and commercial speech shows only the wisdom 
of that distinction, which allows consumer protection law to coexist with robust 
freedom for political speech.  Appellant relies on World Wrestling Federation 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), in which 
defendants ran a campaign with “the stated goal . . . to ‘educate’ its members” and 
the WWF’s sponsors and advertisers that the WWF was a dangerous entity.  Id. at 
521.  Bozell found that the attacks on the WWF were “featured prominently in a 
fundraising video” for the organization, which bragged that the campaign “hurt the 
WWF[] and had increased the [Parents Television Council’s] fundraising revenue 
and given it increased notoriety.”  Id. at 525.  Bozell rejected a motion to dismiss in 
part because the court concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could find the 
																																																								
2 Except insofar as his representations about his books are commercial: if he 
misrepresented the price of the books, false advertising law would be implicated.  
Further, if Dr. Oz were using excerpts from his books to tout particular remedies 
he was also selling, that would be a different matter.  Cf. Gordon & Breach, 859 F. 
Supp. at 1536 (holding that general publication of journal article was protected 
speech; use of article reprints in specific advertising pitches to consumers of the 
products evaluated in the article was commercial speech subject to the Lanham 
Act).  Fortunately, this Court need not decide such issues here, where Appellant 




defendant’s speech to be commercial because of the defendant’s goals of making 
money and promoting itself. 
   Amici respectfully disagree with the result in Bozell.  It is inconsistent with 
the overall case law.  For example, Bozell’s conclusion that self-promotion is 
“commercial” is wildly overbroad.  See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On–Line 
Commc’n Services, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (pointing out, 
in copyright case, that counting self-promotion or notoreity as “commercial” 
benefit renders the concept so broad as to be meaningless). 
   Numerous other cases reject Bozell’s reasoning.  In Raymen v. United 
Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2006), for example, the court found 
that a nonprofit’s internet advertisement stating its political opinions was not 
commercial speech, even though the nonprofit sought contributions from people 
who clicked on the ad.  As the court pointed out, “only after using the 
advertisement (by clicking on it) to access the webpages were viewers exposed to 
the information about USA Next and the solicitation for financial contributions.”  
Id. at 24.  The Raymen court distinguished this from direct promotion of a 
defendant’s own services and noted that “the advertisement here discusses public 
policy issues that are currently the subject of public debate.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Similarly, cognizant of the risks of deterring speech on matters of public 




Treatment of Animals which contained allegedly false statements about an animal 
testing lab were noncommercial speech.  Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Rokke, 978 
F. Supp. 662, 666 (E.D. Va. 1997); see also Wojnarowicz v. American Family 
Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reaching result inconsistent 
with Bozell for advocacy speech used in fundraising).  The D.C. Circuit has 
specifically held that the kind of general “ideological” competition involved in this 
case is not commercial.  See Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 541 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (blog post about book was noncommercial political speech, though 
Esquire stood to profit from gaining readers). 
   In general, critical analyses of a plaintiff’s offerings are not “commercial 
speech” simply because the defendant is also a commercial entity.  As the D.C. 
Circuit explained: 
Of course, writers write and publishers publish political tracts for 
commercial purposes, and it is possible that the kinds of commercial 
methods made illegal by the Lanham Act could be applied to such tracts. 
The actions alleged, however, do not involve such methods. The mere fact 
that the parties may compete in the marketplace of ideas is not sufficient to 
invoke the Lanham Act. To the contrary, it reinforces Esquire’s position 
that its blog post was political speech …. 
 
Farah, 736 F.3d at 541; see also Neurotron, Inc. v. American Ass’n of 
Electrodiagnostic, 189 F. Supp. 2d 271, 276-77 (D. Md. 2001) (article in 
professional medical journal about medical devices wasn’t commercial speech); 




comments about plaintiff in defendant’s newsletter were not actionable under § 
43(a) because they did not promote defendant’s newsletter at the expense of 
plaintiff’s competing newsletter); National Artists Management Co., Inc. v. 
Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (interpreting the Lanham Act 
to avoid application to “speech that relates to both goods and services, as well as 
political issues—for example, misrepresentations made by interested groups which 
may arguably disparage a company and its products because of the company’s 
failure to divest its South African holdings, or disparaging statements regarding a 
corporation’s policy toward product design, included in a law review article 
addressing the law of product liability”); see also Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc. v. City 
of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]here nonprofits 
engage in activities where pure speech and commercial speech are inextricably 
intertwined the entirety must be classified as fully protected noncommercial 
speech.”).   
   Bozell’s lack of fit with the case law is unsurprising, because the reasoning 
in Bozell is misguided.  Fundraising isn’t in itself commercial speech.  When 
ProPublica touts its award-winning investigations and asks for public support, that 




now sue it under the Lanham Act’s strict liability regime rather than under the 
more speech-protective defamation regime.3   
   The rule for which Appellant argues is a dangerous one with the potential 
to convert almost every political dispute into a false advertising case.  Pro-choice 
organizations accuse pro-life organizations of deceptive conduct and seek to 
fundraise as part of their advocacy missions;4 pro-life organizations do the same 
thing.5  Politicians make disputed factual claims about other politicians’ business 
activities, seeking to energize their supporters with these claims, to gain publicity 
with them, and to solicit more contributions as a result.6  None of these disputes 
																																																								
3 Some statements by nonprofits might be commercial speech: In a solicitation of a 
donation in return for a commemorative mug, the description of the mug might 
well qualify as commercial speech, because of the tangible product provided to the 
donor in return for the donation.  Similarly, statements promising that specific 
services would be provided to third parties in return for a donor’s money could 
trigger the concerns underlying the commercial speech doctrine.  But neither 
situation would make the nonprofit’s other communicative activities commercial 
speech, and each is easily distinguishable from the situation here.   
4 See, e.g., Laura Bassett, Planned Parenthood Sees Spike In Donations As Attacks 
Escalate, Huffington Post, July 30, 2015, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/planned-parenthood-
donations_us_55ba2e3fe4b095423d0df22e. 
5 See, e.g., National Right to Life, The Truth About Planned Parenthood, 
http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/plannedparenthood/ (visited Apr. 20, 2016) 
(soliciting donations on page attacking Planned Parenthood). 
6 See, e.g., Alexander Mallin, President Obama Mocks Trump’s Business Ventures, 






should be adjudicated according to the Lanham Act’s strict liability standard.  
Under Appellant’s logic, all of them should be. 
III. Conclusion 
	
   Noncommercial speech, like that of Appellees, is not unregulated.  
Appellant could, and did, challenge it under the rigorous standards set forth by 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for defamation.  His inability to 
prevail under that standard does not entitle him to a lower one, and his arguments 
for why the speech at issue is commercial would put all for-profit—and even much 
nonprofit—speech at risk. 
   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court on the 
Lanham Act claim should be affirmed.  
 
           Respectfully submitted, 
 
           /Mark P. McKenna /   
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